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I Comments I
Suturing the Loophole: Informed Consent
as a Requirement for Procedures Not
Enumerated in Pennsylvania's Medical
Informed Consent Statute
A.D. Burnett II*
The reality is that we have never seen this language that is contained
in H[ouse] B[ill] 2210. I have been informed by the Democratic staff
that it in fact was drafted over the weekend by two special interest
groups-the Pennsylvania Medical Society and the Trial lawyers.
We have never seen it until just a couple of hours ago .... And the
reality is-and these bills turn on the specific language in them and
the various nuances-the reality is, a very small percentage of
members sitting here have actually read the language .... I mean, 2
hours ago we just eliminated property taxes. We had a nice dinner,
and now we are going to deal with tort reform. I mean, what is the
hurry?... [Allthough there [are] a handful of trial lawyers who
know what is in this and a handful of doctors who know what is in
this, the people of Pennsylvania, the 12 million people we represent,
have no idea what is in it and their Representatives do not have any
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2004; M.A., American University; B.A., Pennsylvania State University.
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idea what is in it. 1
-Pennsylvania Representative Greg S. Vitali, minutes prior to the
passing of the bill that would codify medical informed consent.
I. Introduction
In just over five years, malpractice premiums for physicians in
Pennsylvania have risen 170%.2 In response, many physicians have
stopped accepting new patients,3  sought work outside the
Commonwealth, or quit practicing medicine altogether.4 Indeed, the
problem is of such magnitude that some hospitals are unable to fill
residency requirements.5  But Pennsylvania is not alone in this
"epidemic," as the rumblings of disgruntled physicians can be heard in,
amongst other states, New Jersey, Delaware, and West Virginia.6
With the onslaught of such rising medical malpractice premiums,
Pennsylvania physicians are understandably clamoring7  for the
legislature to correct what might be perceived as an injustice.8 However,
when facing this issue, the Pennsylvania General Assembly must strike
an even balance between medical malpractice concerns and patient
welfare. Any actions taken to reduce physician insurance must not tread
on patient rights, and must take into account the already relatively
limited (and, as this Comment will argue, possibly unconstitutional)
means by which the General Assembly allows recourse for medical
procedures performed without a patient's informed consent. This
loophole in Pennsylvania's medical informed consent statute, which
allows physicians to escape liability, must be recognized and given due
consideration before instituting any further reforms that may act to
further suppress patient rights.
This Comment analyzes the state of medical informed consent in
1. H. 180-67, 1996 Sess., at 2453-54 (Pa. 1996) (statement of Representative Greg
S. Vitali).
2. Paul Beebe, Malpractice Solution Sought, CENTRE DAILY TIMES, Jan. 15, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 3267491.
3. M. Paul Jackson, Malpractice Insurance Crises: Bush Slated To Lend an Ear,
Talk About Policy, WILKES-BARRE TIMES LEADER, Jan. 14, 2003, available at 2003 WL
2575633.
4. Beebe, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. Jackson, supra note 3.
7. See Nathan Hershey, Medical Complications: Rendell's Short-Term Fix for the
Malpractice Insurance Crises Doesn't Address the Whole Problem, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTTE, Jan. 15, 2003, available at 2003 WL 3881562 (noting physician concern and
proposed remedies).
8. Indeed, Pennsylvania legislators are even considering amending the state
constitution to place caps on malpractice awards. See Beebe, supra note 2.
1250 [Vol. 108:4
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
Pennsylvania, and argues for "suturing" the informed consent loophole,
either by formally amending the statute, or by recognizing a Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process requirement for informed consent and allowing
creative judicial interpretation. Part II of this Comment examines the
history of medical informed consent by reviewing the evolution of the
doctrine in Pennsylvania from the common law to its codification in the
Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act, 9 and discusses
United States and Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions regarding
patient self-determination. Part III analyzes the statutory state of medical
informed consent in Pennsylvania and its limitations, contrasts it with the
right of self-determination as pronounced in supreme court decisions,
and offers a few solutions to the problem. Finally, Part IV concludes that
statutory informed consent is severely limited, and should either be
redefined by the General Assembly or liberally interpreted by the
judiciary to encompass procedures not enumerated in the statute in an
effort to avoid patent injustice and potential constitutional invalidity.
II. Background
In its legal state,1° the doctrine of informed consent is the idea that a
patient has a right to be informed by her/his doctor of the risks and
benefits of a proposed method of treatment so that the patient may make
an informed decision about whether to allow the physician to proceed.1
The doctrine serves to provide for the patient's physical well-being as
well as her/his self-determination, 2 and to fulfill the informed consent
duty a doctor must inform the patient as to the risks, benefits, probability
of success, and alternatives to a given procedure, as well as obtain the
patient's permission to proceed with the treatment.1
3
The idea that a physician has an affirmative duty to disclose the
risks of a given procedure arose in common law, 14 though originally the
patient's right was only to accept or reject a described procedure.' 5 Tort
law redressed the acts of wayward doctors under the theories of battery,
fraud, and later negligence, 16 and in 1957 the term "informed consent"
was coined. 17
9. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1303.101-.910 (West 2002).
10. As distinguished from the ethical and moral duties that underlie the notion of
informed consent.
11. See JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL
PRACTICE 11 (2d ed. 2001).
12. See id. at 18.
13. See id. at 46, 65.
14. See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 60 (1984).
15. See id. at 49-50.
16. See id. at 49, 59, 132.
17. See id. at 60. Interestingly, the more forward reaching idea and the very term
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A. Pennsylvania's Common Law Informed Consent
Informed consent in Pennsylvania originated from the notion that a
doctor was required to obtain a patient's consent before surgery lest the
doctor be liable under a claim of battery, as first reported in Moscicki v.
Shor in 1932.18 The court in Moscicki19 asserted the still-standing
principle that when a patient is mentally competent to do so, and in the
absence of an emergency, a doctor must receive a patient's consent
before performing an operation or be held accountable under the tort of
battery20 for an unconsented touching of the patient.
21
Patient consent to a particular surgery was later expanded by the
courts to include treatments that are incidental to the primary operation.22
In Smith v. Yohe, 23 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that no
"special authorization" was required for procedures that are part of a
treatment to which the patient has already consented.24 Three years later,
in Gray v. Grunnagle, the court added the now-familiar requirement that
itself were first adopted by a court from an amicus curiae brief filed by the American
College of Surgeons. Id. (discussing Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Tr., 317
P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957)).
18. Moscicki v. Shor, 163 A.2d 341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932). Many credit Justice
Cardozo with promulgating the battery-based consent theme when he asserted, "Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's
consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." Schloendorff v. Soc'y of
N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (doctor trespassed upon patient who had
consented to examination, and not removal, of tumor). See, e.g., Rasmussen by Mitchell
v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 683 (Ariz. 1987) (holding doctrine of informed consent, as
promulgated by Cardozo, includes right to refuse unwanted medical treatment).
19. The patient in Moscicki suffered from dental problems to the extent that twenty-
three teeth were to be removed. Moscicki, 163 A.2d at 341-42. Consenting to the
operation, the patient insisted that only the lower teeth be removed during the visit, and
that the upper teeth be taken at a later time. Id. The patient awoke from the procedure to
find that, despite the dentist's assurances, all twenty-three teeth had in fact been removed,
and shortly thereafter medical complications arose requiring further treatment by other
physicians. Id.
20. This "technical" battery arose only in surgeries because "the patient [was]
typically unconscious and unable to object" to the procedure. Montgomery v. Bazaz-
Sehgal, 798 A.2d 742, 748 (Pa. 2002).
21. Moscicki, 163 A.2d at 342. Eight years later the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
noted that the burden fell upon a plaintiff to prove lack of consent to a surgical procedure.
Dicenzo v. Berg, 16 A.2d 15 (Pa. 1940).
22. See Smith v. Yohe, 194 A.2d 167, 169, 174 (Pa. 1963).
23. The patient in Yohe suffered from a fractured femur and consented to undergoing
anesthesia and having his leg manipulated into its socket. Id. at 169, 174. When the
patient awoke, he found a cast on his leg and that the doctor had inserted a metal pin into
the leg to hold it in place during the manipulation. Id. at 174.
24. Id. at 175. Affirming the dismissal of the suit, the court determined that the
patient failed to prove the pin procedure was so far removed as to not be a part of the
treatment consented to (the manipulation of the leg). Id. at 174-75.
1252 [Vol. 108:4
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
consent to an operation be based on an informed decision.25
In Gray,26 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on the contractual
nature of the doctor-patient relationship to assert that neither oral nor
written consent by a patient to surgery was valid when the patient was
not adequately informed "of the nature of the operation to be performed,
the seriousness of it, the organs of the body involved, the disease or
incapacity sought to be cured, and the possible results ' 27 -thus the
formal birth of informed consent in Pennsylvania.
Soon after Grey, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Cooper v.
Roberts28 announced the "reasonable patient" standard of assessing what
information a doctor is under the duty to disclose,29 and in so doing
formally rejected the community standard.3 ° Under the reasonable
patient standard, the doctor has a duty to disclose "all those facts, risks
and alternatives" that a reasonable patient in the same or similar situation
would want to know before deciding whether to proceed with the
proposed treatment. 31 Further, the court hinted that the informed consent
requirement might not be limited to surgeries, 32 and couched the patient's
right to make an informed decision in terms of respect for the patient's
"physical integrity. 33
Less than a decade later, the Pennsylvania Superior Court had an
opportunity to directly address whether informed consent extended to
non-surgical procedures in Malloy v. Shanahan34 but avoided the issue.35
25. See Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663 (Pa. 1966).
26. In Gray, the patient underwent an exploratory spinal column examination. Id. at
665. Although the patient consented to the operation, he testified that he was never
informed as to the possibility of the paralysis that ensued. Id. at 673-74.
27. Id. at 674 (quoting Robert E. Powell, Consent to Operation, 21 MD. L. REv. 189,
191 (1961)).
28. Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971). In Cooper, the
patient underwent a gastroscope examination wherein the fiberglass instrument was
lowered into the stomach to allow the physician to view a growth on the patient's hernia.
Id. at 648. Several hours after the procedure the patient began experiencing difficulties
and went to the emergency room where it was discovered that the gastroscope had
punctured the patient's stomach. Id.
29. Id. at 650.
30. The community standard for a duty to disclose examines the general practice of
disclosure for a given procedure in the physician's medical community at the time the
physician is alleged to have failed to disclose the information. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 650 n.2 (noting that although a gastroscope examination may not be
deemed a surgery, that the patient was anesthetized and the procedure performed in a
special room meant it could be likened to an operation, and thus "[t]he same duty of
disclosure obtains whether or not the treatment can be technically termed operative").
33. Id. at 649.
34. Malloy v. Shanahan, 421 A.2d 803 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
35. See id. In Malloy, the physician prescribed medication for a patient's arthritis,
and although no refills were authorized, the patient succeeded in having the prescription
continuously refilled over a twelve-year period, which eventually led to the patient's
20041 1253
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Instead, the court raised the specter of proximate cause by determining
that the patient and the pharmacists dispensing the medication at issue
were the direct cause of the patient's problems, rather than the physician
who originally authorized the pharmacist to dispense the mediation.36
The issue of proximate cause that the court relied on in Malloy was
next addressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Gouse v. Cassel3 7
when it held that the patient need only show that she/he was inadequately
informed of the procedure, and not that the failure of the doctor to inform
was the proximate cause of the consent itself.38 Although this appeared a
giant stride for patient rights, the court quickly narrowed the scope of
informed consent the very next year in Sinclair v. Block39 to include only
procedures that fit the "purpose" of the doctrine, and foreclosed any
possibility that such a purpose could be found in procedures short of
surgery.
4
partial loss of vision. Id. at 804. In refusing to entertain an action based on informed
consent, the trial court asserted that historically the doctrine only applied to surgeries. Id.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, and noted that the informed consent
requirement had not yet been deemed to include prolonged treatment of the type where
"any change of condition [could] be diagnosed and controlled." Id. However, in
affirming the court hinged its decision on the fact that the patient had only visited the
doctor once during the twelve-year period, and thus the doctor had not been given the
opportunity to discover and control any side effects of the medication. Id.
36. Id. at 804. The dissenting opinion noted that under the battery approach the
results of the case would have been different had the doctor injected the medication into
the patient rather than the patient taking the medication orally. Id. at 806. Further, the
dissent advocated following the paths of many other states by adopting a negligence,
rather than the battery, approach to informed consent cases. Id. There is still a call for a
shift to the negligence standard today. See Bryan J. Warren, Comment, Pennsylvania
Medical Informed Consent Law: A Call To Protect Patient Autonomy Rights by
Abandoning the Battery Approach, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 917 (2000); see also Daniel A.
Durst, Comment, Cutting Through Pennsylvania's Medical Informed Consent Statute: A
Reasonable Interpretation Abolishing the Surgical Requirement, 104 DICK. L. REV. 197
(1999) (noting the ambiguity of the battery approach to informed consent when applied to
Pennsylvania's medical informed consent statute).
37. See Gouse v. Cassel, 615 A.2d 331 (Pa. 1992). In Gouse, the patient alleged he
was not adequately informed as to the lack of necessity of a splenectomy that later
resulted in medical complications. Id. at 332-33.
38. See id. at 334-36. Further, the court reemphasized patient autonomy, noting that
the "reasonable patient" standard without a proximate cause requirement neatly fit the
balance between patient self-determination and a physician's freedom to treat without
fear of liability. Id. at 334.
39. Sinclair v. Block, 633 A.2d 1137 (Pa. 1993). In an attempt to remove the
patient's child from the birth canal during labor, the physician resorted to using forceps
which fractured the baby's skull and caused it to seizure. Id. at 1138. Interestingly, this
case was heard just two weeks after the court's decision in Gouse. Compare Gouse, 615
A.2d at 331 (decided October 8, 1992), with Sinclair, 633 A.2d at 1137 (argued October
21, 1992).
40. See Sinclair, 633 A.2d at 1140-41. In affirming the trial court's ruling that
informed consent was not a requirement for the use of forceps, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court asserted that informed consent only applies to "surgical or operative procedure[s]."
1254 [Vol. 108:4
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That informed consent was not a requirement for non-surgical
procedures was reiterated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court less than
five years later in Morgan v. MacPhai4' when it affirmed the dismissal
of informed consent claims based on non-surgical injections.42 In doing
so, the court asserted that "[i]t is the invasive nature of the surgical or
operative procedure involving a surgical cut and the use of surgical
instruments that gives rise to the need to inform the patient of risks prior
to surgery. 4 3  Further, the court went on to define "operate" as to
"perform an excision or incision, or to make a suture on the body or any
of its organs to restore health.",44  Thus, the hope that non-surgical
procedures might be subject to informed consent as noted by the courts
in Cooper and Malloy was quickly dashed in Morgan, and became moot.
B. Pennsylvania Statutory Informed Consent
The Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act
("MCARE") 45 has its genesis in the 1975 Health Care Services
Id. at 1140. The court determined that requiring informed consent for the natural delivery
of a child was inconsistent with the doctrine's purpose of giving the patient all of the
information needed to make a decision of whether to proceed with a surgery-as the
patient was already at the end of her pregnancy term no choice was left, the baby was
going to be born regardless of whether the patient consented or not. Id. The court
asserted that in such a situation a physician is merely present "to assist nature" during the
birthing process. Id. In further distancing birth from a surgical procedure, the court
noted that forceps were merely a tool used in the delivery process, and as the patient had
already given her general consent to the doctor's help in the delivery, no additional
consent was required for the use of such a tool. Id.
41. Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617 (Pa. 1997). The patient, suffering from
broken ribs, underwent "a procedure whereby a local anesthetic [was] injected into the
area around [her] ribs," after which her lung collapsed. Id. at 618 n. 1, n.2.
42. Id. This holding contradicts the dissent's assertion in Malloy that a physician
would be required to obtain the patient's informed consent before injecting medication
that could have serious consequences to the patient's health. See supra note 36.
Interestingly, had the patient's injury in Morgan occurred via a catheter, the informed
consent claim would have likely prevailed. See Valles v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 758
A.2d 1238 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (informed consent required where guide-wire used
during insertion of catheter punctured lung).
43. Morgan, 704 A.2d at 620. The court noted that the Healthcare Services
Malpractice Act (the forerunner to the present-day MCARE) did not apply because the
events leading to the injury occurred prior to the statute's enactment, and the statute itself
was limited in scope and would not have applied anyway. Id. at 207 n.6.
44. Id. at 206. (quoting TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1256 (16th ed.
1989)).
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1303.101-.910 (West 2002). MCARE is a relatively
large act, and is described by the legislature as:
An Act reforming the law on medical professional liability; providing for
patient safety and reporting; establishing the Patient Safety Authority and the
Patient Safety Trust Fund; abrogating regulations; providing for medical
professional liability informed consent, damages, expert qualifications,
limitations of actions and medical records; establishing the Interbranch
2004] 1255
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Malpractice Act,46 and serves to ensure that reliable and safe health care
is available throughout Pennsylvania by, among other things, promoting
safe physician practice and helping curtail the costs of physician
malpractice insurance.47
Medical informed consent is codified under chapter five of
MCARE, which deals with physician liability and declares as its policy
the need to "ensure a fair legal process and reasonable compensation" for
patients injured due to "medical negligence. 48 Section 1303.504 sets
forth a physician's informed consent duty, and states:
(a) Duty of Physicians. Except in emergencies, a physician owes a
duty to a patient to obtain the informed consent of the patient or the
patient's authorized representative prior to conducting the following
procedures:
(1) Performing surgery, including the related administration of
anesthesia.
(2) Administering radiation or chemotherapy.
Commission on Venue; providing for medical professional liability insurance;
establishing the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Fund;
providing for medical professional liability claims; establishing the Joint
Underwriting Association; regulating medical professional liability insurance;
providing for medical licensure regulation; providing for administration;
imposing penalties; and making repeals.
H.R. 154, No.13, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2002).
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.101 (West 2002) (revised to MCARE). This was
originally enacted "in response to a perceived medical malpractice crises." Warren,
supra note 36, at 917. The informed consent provisions of the current statute came into
effect in 1997. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.504 (West 2002).
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.102 (West 2002). The statute's declaration of
policy asserts:
(1) It is the purpose of this act to ensure that medical care is available in this
Commonwealth through a comprehensive and high-quality health care system.
(2) Access to a full spectrum of hospital services and to highly trained
physicians in all specialties must be available across this Commonwealth.
(3) To maintain this system, medical professional liability insurance has to be
obtainable at an affordable and reasonable cost in every geographic region of
this Commonwealth.
(4) A person who has sustained injury or death as a result of medical
negligence by a health care provider must be afforded a prompt determination
and fair compensation.
(5) Every effort must be made to reduce and eliminate medical errors by
identifying the problems and implementing solutions that promote patient
safety.
(6) Recognition and furtherance of all of these elements is essential to the
public health, safety, and welfare of all the citizens of Pennsylvania.
Id.
48. Id. § 1303.502.
1256 [Vol. 108:4
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(3) Administering a blood transfusion.
(4) Inserting a surgical device or appliance.
(5) Administering an experimental medication, using an
experimental device or using an approved medication or device
in an experimental manner.
Under the statute, a physician has a duty to obtain a patient's
informed consent5° before performing: surgery, or anesthesia in
preparation for surgery; chemotherapy or radiation treatments; blood
transfusions; experimental medicinal treatments, or using medication "in
an experimental manner;" procedures involving experimental devices, or
using approved devices "in an experimental manner;" and treatments
wherein a "surgical device or appliance" is inserted into the body.51 As
the statute encompasses more than surgery, informed consent under
MCARE serves as an expansion from the common law definition of
"operate" as enunciated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Morgan.52  This expansion may be attributable to perceived injustices
that arose under the common law doctrine,53 but the judiciary interprets
the statute very narrowly and still utilizes the Morgan definition of
"operate" to decide if a questionable procedure requires informed
consent.54
49. Id. § 1303.504(a).
50. For informed consent, the physician must relay to the patient "the risks and
alternatives that a reasonably prudent patient would require to make an informed decision
as to that procedure." Id. § 1303.504(b).
51. Id. § 1303.504(a).
52. See supra Part II.A.
53. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.504(a) (West 2002), with Hoffman v.
Brandywine Hosp., 661 A.2d 397 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (as it was not clear that blood
transfusion that infected patient with HIV occurred during surgery rather than in the
hours following surgery, patient's informed consent claim failed), and Dible v. Vagley,
612 A.2d 493 (Pa. 1992) (physician did not need to obtain patient's informed consent
before administering radiation as treatment did not involve surgery), and Southard v.
Temple Univ. Hosp., 731 A.2d 603 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (question of whether physician
must inform patient as to FDA classification of appliance or that physician will be using
appliance in innovative manner is one for finder of fact). Also compare PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, § 1303.504(d)(2) (liability for failure to obtain informed consent where patient is
misled as to physician's "credentials, training or experience"), with Kaskie v. Wright, 589
A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (that physician was not licensed to practice medicine was
irrelevant for informed consent).
54. See, e.g., Stalsitz v. Allentown Hosp., 814 A.2d 766, 772 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)
(noting Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted the statute narrowly, and the common
law surgical requirement still stands).
12572004]
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C. "Right To Die" and Bodily Integrity
A corollary to the doctrine of informed consent is a patient's right to
self-determination, or the right "to refuse treatment and to withdraw
consent to treatment once begun."55 Self-determination came to light in
Pennsylvania following the touch-stone "right to die" case, In re Fiori,
wherein the family of a patient who had been in a nineteen-year
vegetative state sought to remove life support.56 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court weighed the patient's right to self-determination against
the Commonwealth's rights to protect life, third-parties, "the ethical
integrity of the medical community," and to prevent suicide57 before
holding life support could be removed from a patient in such a vegetative
58state. In reaching its decision, the court refused to examine the
constitutional issues present, noting that it was inappropriate to decide a
case on constitutional grounds where common law methods are
available.5 9 However, the United States Supreme Court had reviewed the
constitutional issues six years earlier in a case strikingly similar to
Fiori,60 and the court in Fiori did take notice.6'
In Cruzan v. Director of Missouri Department of Health, the parents
of a patient in a vegetative state sought to have their daughter's feeding
tube removed.62 In reviewing whether a Missouri statute that required
"clear and convincing evidence" of an incompetent's desire to refuse
medical treatment was constitutional,63 the United States Supreme Court
asserted that it could be "inferred" from its past decisions that competent
individuals possess "a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment. '64 This Fourteenth Amendment
55. In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 910 (Pa. 1996) (withdrawing life-sustaining
nourishment from patient in permanent vegetative state) (quoting Mack v. Mack, 618
A.2d 744 (1992)). Both the Pennsylvania and United States Supreme Courts
acknowledge the right of self-determination as the founding principle of informed
consent. Id. at 909-10; accord Cruzan v. Dir. Missouri Dep't Of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
269-70 (1990). The present conception of patient self-determination can be traced to
former United States Supreme Court Justice Gray, who asserted, "No right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (court refused to order plaintiff to submit
to surgical examination to asses extent of injuries).
56. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 908-09.
57. Id. at 910.
58. Id. at 912-13.
59. Id. at 909.
60. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
61. See Fiori, 673 A.2d at 908, 911, 913 (quoting and citing Cruzan).
62. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266-67.
63. Id. at 280.
64. Id. at 278.
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Due Process right65 acts as the "logical corollary" to the doctrine of
66 tu hinformed consent, and thus the Court assumed the existence of a "right
to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.,
67
Seven years later, the United States Supreme Court reviewed its
decision in Cruzan in the context of a physician assisted suicide case.68
In Washington v. Glucksberg, a group of physicians and terminally-ill
patients challenged a state statute making it illegal to assist in suicide.6 9
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had in Fiori, the Court in
Glucksberg weighed the interests of the state against those of the patients
to determine that the statute was indeed constitutional.7 ° In so doing, the
Court reiterated what was "strongly suggested" in Cruzan: patients may
have a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause to reject life-saving medical treatment.7'
III. Analysis
Pennsylvania judges have often found it troublesome that informed
consent is drawn on the lines of surgical versus non-surgical
procedures, 72  and thus have occasionally allowed for creative
circumventions of this strict dichotomy.73 The advent of the informed
65. Other courts have defined the right to refuse treatment in terms of a privacy
right. See Super. of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977);
see also In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (couching right to discontinue medical
treatment as one of penumbral rights found in United States Constitution and as
enunciated by United States Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965)).
66. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270.
67. Id. at 279.
68. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
69. Id. at 705-08.
70. Id. at 728 n.20, 735 (state's historical and well-rooted interest in preventing
suicide outweighs interest in assisting suicide). See also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793,
807-08 (1997) (companion case distinguishing Glucksberg as right to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment, not right to commit suicide).
71. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720, 743.
72. See Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgal, 798 A.2d 742 (Pa. 2002) (concurring opinion
noting that the court should reevaluate the battery approach to informed consent);
Hoffman v. Brandywine Hosp., 661 A.2d 397 (Pa. Super Ct. 1995) (concurring judge
"write[s] separately to emphasize [his] discomfort with the distinction between operative
and nonsurgical procedures in [the] informed consent law"); Stover v. Ass'n of Thoracic
& Cardio. Surgeons, 635 A.2d 1047, 1054 n.6 (Pa. Super Ct. 1994) ("We would be less
than candid if we did not admit to a degree of artificiality in creating a distinction which
limits the touching required for actionable informed consent to be the surgical cut ....
However, it appears that until such time as our supreme court expands the technical
assault definition, such artificiality must hold sway.").
73. For example, the Superior Court used the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
reasoning in Morgan to expand the common law list of procedures that fall under the
umbrella of surgery to include root canals. Perkins v. Desipio, 736 A.2d 608, 608-09 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1999). In Perkins, the patient underwent a root canal that led to a severe
2004] 1259
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
consent statute in MCARE could have proven a useful excuse for the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to reevaluate the state of informed consent,
and perhaps could have served as a springboard into a negligence-based
approach to the doctrine, as part of MCARE's stated goal is to combat
"medical negligence. 74 However, the court has steadfastly refused to
refashion the parameters into a more equitable divide,75 and thus lower
courts must still apply the surgical/battery approach when facing an
informed consent case.76 Because the judiciary has refused to reevaluate
informed consent in the wake of its codification, the statute today
undoubtedly stands to better shield physician malpractice rather than
recognize and promote patient rights of self-determination.77 More than
this, statutorily imposing the parameters of informed consent around the
relatively narrow notions of what the General Assembly considers
appropriate is fundamentally flawed, and perhaps even unconstitutional.
A. MCARE Informed Consent Does Not Meet the Demands of Today's
Technology
The codification of informed consent under MCARE is flawed in
that, with few exceptions, it relies on an outdated "surgical" requirement
infection and the ultimate removal of his tooth. Id. The court used the definition of
"operate" set forth in Morgan to determine that, regardless of the method, a root canal
constituted an "invasion into the body involving the use of surgical instruments to make
an excision in order to relieve discomfort or restore the patient's health," and thus was a
procedure subject to the doctrine of informed consent. Id. at 611. Further, the court
noted that the same principle would be applicable in other non-surgical contexts, such as
the removal of cysts or growths on the body. Id. Malfeasance has also been used by
lawyers, with some success, as an alternative to informed consent, but the doctrine has its
drawbacks. Compare, e.g., Fink v. Bleyaert, 633 A.2d 1137 (Pa. D. & C. 4th 1999)
(patient not informed as to potential for heart attack that occurred after series of steroid
injections), with Bazaz-Sehgal, 798 A.2d at 749 (noting that limitations of malfeasance
include plaintiff proving causation).
74. See supra note 47; see also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.502 (West 2002)
(stating policy of chapter dealing with medical professional liability is, in part, "to ensure
a fair legal process and reasonable compensation for persons injured due to medical
negligence...").
75. The Pennsylvania Superior Court attempted to separate informed consent claims
for non-consented to and consented to surgeries into negligence and battery camps, but
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was quick to erase these new boundaries. See Bazaz-
Sehgal, 798 A.2d at 748-49 (reiterating that informed consent sounds in battery,
regardless of whether surgery was consented to or not).
76. Valles v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 805 A.2d 1232 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)
(informed consent claim is battery claim); Bazaz-Sehgal, 798 A.2d at 748-49 (informed
consent still sounds in battery and not negligence).
77. The General Assembly's declaration that "ensuring the future availability of and
access to quality health care is a fundamental responsibility that [we] must fulfill as a
promise to our children, our parents, and our grandparents" appears to act as an excuse
for the statute's narrow requirements for informed consent. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 1303.502 (West 2002).
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to apply.78 Society is facing new advances in technology and the
sciences, advances that allow for non-surgical medical procedures, but
procedures that nonetheless have inherent risks. A physician that uses
lasers to correct the vision of a patient should be required to relay the
risks of blindness. A physician who uses sound waves to destroy kidney
and gall stones should be required to relay the risks of damaging a
patient's pacemaker. Physicians should be required to relay the dangers
of the hundreds, if not thousands, of medications injected and prescribed
each day that have the potential to do just as much, if not more, damage
to a patient's body as a scalpel.79 Informed consent must be redrawn to
face these new dangers. 80
That the General Assembly had to act to plug the many common
law injustices81 in the strict, surgical approach to informed consent
demonstrates the fallibility of enacting a laundry list of procedures
deemed worthy of a physician informing a patient of the risks and
78. See supra Part II.B.
79. For example, the drugs warfarin (brand name Coumadin) and isotretinoin (brand
name Accutane) may be prescribed for blood thinning and the treatment of pustular acne,
respectively. Telephone interview with Lt. Jeffrey G. Newman, PharmD., NCPS, Senior
Assistant Pharmacy Officer, Indian Health Service (Jan. 14, 2003). However, both can
have serious side-effects and could cause severe injury or death to an unborn fetus. Id.
Under MCARE, a physician is under no obligation to inform a patient of these side
effects because they do not fall within the informed consent provisions. See supra Part
lI.B. Thus, the statute could serve to protect intrusions into what the United States
Supreme Court has recognized as a fundamental right to choose whether or not to have a
child. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). Other
medications are intrusive on the mind, and yet under MCARE the mere method of
administration can exempt a physician from warning a patient as to their possible effects.
For example, an injection of the psychotic drug proloxin would not require a physician to
obtain the patient's informed consent under MCARE, and yet the toxin acts:
on all levels of the central nervous system as well as on multiple organ
systems .... It can induce catatonic-like states, alter electroencephalographic
tracings, and cause swelling of the brain. Adverse reactions include
drowsiness, excitement, restlessness, bizarre dreams, hypertension, nausea,
vomiting, loss of appetite, salivation, dry mouth, perspiration, headache,
constipation, blurred vision, impotency, eczema, jaundice, tremors, and muscle
spasms . . . . It may cause tardive, an often irreversible syndrome of
uncontrollable movements that can prevent a person from exercising basic
functions such as driving an automobile, and neuroleptic malignant syndrome,
which is 30% fatal for those who suffer from it.
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 239 n.6 (1990).
80. Indeed, even absent technological break-throughs, the "surgery" delineation is an
inadequate means of classification. Compare, e.g., Stalsitz v. Allentown Hosp., 814 A.2d
766, 778 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (court unable to determine if angioplasty, that is, the
insertion of a wire and inflation of a balloon in a patient's arteries, constitutes surgery
within the realm of requiring informed consent), with supra note 73 (discussing Perkins
v. Desipio, 736 A.2d 608 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding that informed consent is required
for root canals)).
81. See supra note 53.
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ramifications of treatment. As new technologies arise and further
injustices occur under statutory informed consent, the public will seek
redress in the form of statutory amendments. Although this serves as a
normal function of the democratic process, it is not an efficient method
to address the problem, and future legislative "fixes" will only serve as
band-aids in a seemingly Napoleonic process.
B. Informed Consent as a Constitutional Right
As informed consent was implicit in recognizing the right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment, it may have itself become a de facto right
under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Indeed,
statutorily relying on a list of procedures to determine what falls within
the realm of requiring informed consent may contradict what the United
States Supreme Court assumed was a Fourteenth Amendment right to
refuse unwanted medical treatment. 82  Finally, as a historically deep-
seated doctrine, informed consent readily fits traditional notions of a
Fourteenth Amendment right.
1. Informed Consent as the Building-Block for the Right To
Refuse Medical Treatment
In their respective "right to die" cases, both the United States and
Pennsylvania Supreme Courts laid the foundation for their holdings on
the common law right of bodily integrity.83 On top of this foundation,
the courts set the building-block doctrine of informed consent as a
requirement, absent emergency situations, to medical treatment. 84 It was
on the informed consent building-block that both courts then created the
"logical corollary" of the right to refuse medical treatment.85 If the right
82. See Cruzan v. Dir. Missouri Dep't Of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 743 (1997).
83. See In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 909-10 (Pa. 1996) ("[N]o right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person.") (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co.
v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)); see also Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269 (quoting Union
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
84. See Fiori, 673 A.2d at 910 (informed consent developed from right to self-
autonomy, and stands for proposition that "absent an emergency situation, medical
treatment may not be imposedwithout the patient's informed consent"); see also Cruzan,
497 U.S. at 269 (the "notion of bodily integrity has been embodied in the requirement
that informed consent is generally required for medical treatment").
85. See Fiori, 673 A.2d at 910 ("A logical corollary to this doctrine is the patient's
right, in general, 'to refuse treatment and withdraw consent to treatment once begun."')
(quoting Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 755 (Md. 1992)); see also Cruzan, 497 U.S. at
270 ("the logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient
generally possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment").
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to refuse medical treatment was built upon and was the corollary to
informed consent, it follows that informed consent may be in itself a
constitutional right. Indeed, it would appear a logical outgrowth when
applied to potentially harmful medical treatment: as there is a right to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, there must naturally exist a right
to refuse life-threatening medical treatment, regardless of the medical
procedures employed.
Thus, MCARE's informed consent arguably weakens its use as the
building-block of the right to refuse medical treatment by limiting itself
to primarily surgical procedures.86 Because the definition of "operate" as
parlayed by the court in Morgan v. MacPhai8 7 serves as the border for
surgical procedures, 88 it acts, with few exceptions, 89 as a red flag for
when a physician must obtain a patient's informed consent. By staking
this statutory flag in MCARE, the General Assembly not only explicitly
asserts when a physician is required to obtain informed consent,9" but
implicitly condones the withholding of information that may be needed
by deliberative patients in situations not enumerated in the statute.91 In
so doing, it denies a patient the right to information needed to refuse both
life-saving and life-threatening treatments unless the procedure falls
86. See supra Part ll.B.
87. See supra Part II.A.
88. That this common law definition is still used to interpret MCARE's informed
consent is not doubted. Stalsitz v. Allentown Hosp., 814 A.2d 766, 772 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2002) (noting common law surgical requirement still stands). Further, neither "surgery"
nor "operation" is defined anywhere in MCARE. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 1303.103 (West 2002) (definitions for chapter one of MCARE), with id. § 1303.302
(definitions for chapter three of MCARE), and id. § 1303.503 (definitions for chapter five
of MCARE), and id. § 1303.702 (definitions for chapter seven of MCARE), and id.
§ 1303.902 (definitions for chapter nine of MCARE).
89. See supra Part II.B.
90. "A physician is liable for failure to obtain informed consent only if the patient
proves that receiving [the enumerated information] would have been a substantial factor
in the patient's decision whether to undergo a procedure set forth in [MCARE's informed
consent statute]." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.504(d) (West 2002); see supra Part lI.B.
91. See Cruzan v. Dir. Missouri Dep't Of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1990); In re
Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 910 (Pa. 1996). One might argue that the right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment is merely the right to say "yes" or "no," and not to receive information
about the procedure prior to treatment. However, even the dissenting opinion in Cruzan
noted that "[tihe right to be free from unwanted medical attention is a right to evaluate
the potential benefit of treatment and its possible consequences according to one's own
values and to make a personal decision whether to subject oneself to the intrusion."
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 309 (Brennan, J. dissenting). For a patient to "evaluate" the
treatment, evaluation would necessarily entail the imparting of information by the
physician. One might further debate whether a duty to impart such information exists
absent a patient's request, but then policy would seem to dictate that those with greater
knowledge of any potential risks and complications be charged with explaining them,
thus circumventing the danger of requiring a lay patient to know what to ask.
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92within one of the statute's five narrow categories. As such,
Pennsylvania's statutory informed consent is arguably granting
physicians an illegitimate privilege that directly contradicts the right to
self-determination as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
Cruzan and Glucksberg, and by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Fiori.
93
As both the Pennsylvania and United States Supreme Courts
asserted, at the heart of self-determination exists the right of a patient to
reject medical treatment-not just surgery.9 4  As Justice O'Connor
pointed out in Cruzan, a feeding tube traveling through a patient's nose
and throat into the stomach is just as intrusive as surgery and is
indistinguishable from any other form of "medical treatment., 95  Yet
under MCARE and the Morgan definition of "operate," such a procedure
would not require a physician to obtain a patient's informed consent.
96
The United States Supreme Court Justices have never disagreed as
to whether a right to refuse medical treatment exists, but only as to
whether a state's interests outweigh this right.97 Thus, a limitation to the
right to refuse medical treatment may arise when balanced against
legitimate state interests.98  However, Pennsylvania's interests in
92. See supra Part II.B.
93. See supra Part II.C.
94. See Fiori, 673 A.2d at 910; see also Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269-70. Informed
consent provisions in MCARE avoid the term "medical" altogether, instead opting for the
much narrower word "surgical." See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.504 (West 2002).
95. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 288 (O'Connor, J. concurring). Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun agree in their dissent that the practice constitutes medical treatment, and
rely on lists of medical devices, reimbursable under Medicaid, as well as Food and Drug
Administration regulations regarding medical devices, to arrive at this conclusion. Id. at
307-08. Justice O'Connor further asserted that when a state forces such treatment on a
patient it "burden[s] [the] individual's liberty interests as much as any state coercion."
Id. at 288.
96. Compare supra Part II.A (discussing definition of "operate"), with Part II.B
(procedures requiring informed consent under MCARE).
97. Compare Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 (assuming constitutional right to refuse
medical treatment), with id. at 287 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (agreeing it may be inferred
that there exists a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment), and id. at 293-301
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (noting constitutional right to refuse medical treatment may exist
but must be weighed against state interest in preventing suicide), and id. at 302 (Brennan,
J. dissenting) (asserting the state's interests do not outweigh patient's constitutional right
to refuse medical treatment), and id. at 331 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (noting it is
undisputed patient has a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment). Compare also
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (noting the court has "strongly suggested" there exists a
constitutional right to refuse medical treatment), with id. at 777-78 (Souter, J. concurring)
(noting constitutional right to refuse unwanted medical treatment), and id. at 743
(Stevens, J. concurring) (asserting right to refuse medical treatment is "not just a
common-law rule"), and id. at 789-92 (Breyer, J. concurring) (noting that although right
to refuse medical treatment exists it may not include right to commit suicide).
98. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79; see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 743 (Stevens,
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MCARE do not outweigh a patient's right to refuse medical treatment
because the courts have only allowed this to occur when a state is
seeking to protect a patient's life. 99 Protecting human life cannot be
adequately furthered by binding patient self-determination via a statute
that refutes informed consent more often than it requires it,100 and by a
statute that may unnecessarily risk patient life.' 0 '
2. Informed Consent in the "Right To Die" Cases
That competence served as a cornerstone in the "right to die" cases
means that informed consent may have served as an implicit
constitutional right. In Cruzan, the Court's starting point was an
assumption that a competent person has a constitutional right to refuse
life-saving medical treatment. 10 2 The issue the Court faced was whether
procedural safeguards enacted by the Missouri legislature were
appropriate in light of the fact that a patient was incompetent and "not
able to make an informed and voluntary choice"'0 3 to refuse medical
treatment. That it was the lack of competence that was at issue
J. concurring with this assumption). Among other things, courts have overridden an
individual's right to self-determination when the welfare of others or society is at risk.
See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (state may use police power to order
vaccination of citizens for welfare of whole); see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
210 (1990) (state prison may force prisoner to take antipsychotic drugs where prisoner
dangerous to self or others). Indeed, the founders of MCARE assert the police powers
within the policy of the statute itself. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.102 (West 2002)
("The General Assembly finds and declares... [that the policy of MCARE] is essential
to the public health, safety and welfare of all citizens of Pennsylvania.").
99. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282; see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 742. The courts
in Glucksberg, Cruzan, and Fiori weighed state interests against an individual's right of
self-autonomy. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728, n.20, 729-33; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280;
Fiori, 673 A.2d at 910.
100. See supra Part II.B.
101. See supra Part III.A.
102. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. Indeed, even the dissenting Justices recognized such a
right. See id. at 304 (dissent of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun); id. at 331
(Stevens, J. dissenting); cf id. at 293-95 (Scalia, J. concurring) (patient's interest in
discontinuing medical treatment can be overridden by state's interest in preventing
suicide).
103. Id. at 280 (emphasis added). Indeed, the ability to process information needed to
make just such a choice is a recurring theme in abortion cases. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622 (1979) (a pregnant minor has the right to exercise self-autonomy and obtain
an abortion where it can be shown "she is mature enough and well enough informed to
make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician"). Statutes requiring
informed consent in the abortion context were often deemed state-sponsored propaganda,
but there has been a general shift since the days of Roe v. Wade. See Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-87 (1992) (discussing
evolution of decisions involving informed consent); id. at 936 (Blackmun, J. dissenting)
(asserting forced informed consent literature was state-sponsored propaganda); id. at 993
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (noting shift).
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demonstrates the importance of informed consent to the decision-it was
the patient's inability to process the information needed to make an
informed decision that brought the matter before the Court. Thus it was
implicit in the analysis that a patient be provided the information
necessary to make an informed decision of whether or not to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment.1
0 4
That informed consent may serve as an implicit constitutional right
can also be seen in Glucksberg. The Court in Glucksberg cited, from a
Cardozo informed-consent case,105 the proposition that "every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body."' 0 6 It is implicit in requiring that a patient be
of "adult years and sound mind" to exercise this right that the patient be
afforded such information as is needed to make a decision on whether to
undergo or refuse medical treatment. 0 7 Thus informed consent may be
implicit in the right to refuse medical treatment; and if so, MCARE
circumvents this right for procedures not enumerated in the statute and
allows physicians to treat adult patients of sound mind under a cloak of
incompetence. 
08
3. The Doctrine of Informed Consent Meets the Requirements for
a Constitutional Right
Informed consent passes those tests used to determine whether an
104. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
105. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 804 n.7 (1997) ("Cardozo's famous statement...
was simply an informed consent case.").
106. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 777 (1997) (Souter, J. concurring)
(quoting Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)) (emphasis added).
The United States Supreme Court has cited this proposition several times. See also
Vacco, 521 U.S. 804 n.7; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
also cited this assertion in Fiori. In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 910 (Pa. 1996).
107. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. If the "adult years and sound mind"
requirements had no meaning, then children and incompetents would be able to decide
for themselves whether or not to allow a physician to administer, say, a tetanus shot. An
adult of sound mind would surely consent to the pain from an injection as she/he is able
to weigh the costs and benefits of receiving the shot-an instant of pain balanced against
the possibility of tetanus, and with it death. A child or incompetent, however, may not be
able to fathom the gravity or consequences of refusing such treatment, and instead opt to
avoid the pain of an injection. Likewise, most adults of sound mind will refrain from
over-indulging in those prescribed medications that arouse feelings of euphoria, whereas
a child or incompetent may seek only the instant gratification of such medication with no
comprehension of the consequences.
108. Further, Justice Stevens refuted the idea that the right to refuse medical treatment
served as "the outer limits of' an individual's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 744 (concurring opinion) (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992)). Indeed, informed
consent surely falls within its boundaries.
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asserted liberty interest 0 9 is a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
right." To be afforded protection under this amendment, an asserted
interest must be well-defined, "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition,"' " and "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' such that
'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.""' 2
Where it is determined that such a fundamental right does indeed exist, a
state may not infringe upon it unless the action "is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest."" 
3
The United States Supreme Court makes clear that there exists a
long tradition of self-autonomy and informed consent. 1 4 As such, the
judiciary might strictly examine those governmental interests pursued in
MCARE's informed consent provisions,' 5 and in so doing would
109. Liberty interests can be considered rights when recognized as enforceable
against the state. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 768 n. 10 (Souter, J. concurring).
110. This serves to "protect individual liberty against 'certain government actions
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them' . . . and to 'provide
heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights
and liberty interests."' Id. at 719-20 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986)). The United States Supreme Court has been slow to define rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause for fear of implementing the "policy
preferences" of the Court, and thus there may never be an all-encompassing definition for
those rights that fall under the clause. Id. at 720-21. However, declaring informed
consent as an embodiment of the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is not an
expansion of the due process clause, but merely an enunciation of an already implicitly
accepted principle. See supra Part IIIB; infra Part III.C.
111. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977)).
112. Id. at 721 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
113. Id. (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
114. See Cruzan v. Dir. Missouri Dep't Of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1990)
(noting history of informed consent, and asserting the doctrine is "firmly entrenched" in
United States law); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725 (noting that basing assumption
that there exists a right to refuse life-saving medical treatment on common law right of
bodily integrity and doctrine of informed consent is "entirely consistent with this
Nation's history and constitutional traditions"). Although the term "informed consent"
did not formally arise until the mid-twentieth century (see supra note 17), bodily integrity
serves as the doctrine's underpinning, as the Court in Cruzan noted:
At common law, even the touching of one person by another without consent
and without legal justification was a battery .... Before the turn of the century,
this Court observed "no right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded,
by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." This notion of bodily
integrity has been embodied in the requirement that informed consent is
generally required for medical treatment.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269-70 (emphasis added) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). See also id. at 277 (asserting informed consent encompasses
right to refuse medical treatment).
115. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (strictly examining
an ordinance that dictates what members of a family may live in the same household in
light of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause). However, a statute need only
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undoubtedly determine that such interests can be obtained in a less
burdensome manner.
Under MCARE's informed consent, the balance between limiting
malpractice insurance and patient self-autonomy is hinged primarily on
the surgical divide,' 16 and as such is not "narrowly tailored" to serve
Pennsylvania's interests. MCARE seeks to limit physician malpractice
insurance, while at the same time seeks to prevent medical errors and
provide patient's a means to redress such errors if and when they
occur. 1 17  The concerns are not mutually exclusive, yet the informed
consent provisions pit patient against physician. Requiring physicians to
obtain informed consent in only limited circumstances protects physician
liability, but at the cost of patient welfare and self-determination. Less
burdensome means exist to effectuate these goals-for example,
requiring informed consent for all medical treatment"i8 would not only
promote patient autonomy, but presumably reduce malpractice claims,
and thus insurance premiums as well." 19
bear "a rational relation to some legitimate end" when the interest asserted does not rise
to the status of a "right." Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 809 (1997) (as there is no
constitutional right of suicide, New York statute need only be rationally related to state's
interest in preventing same).
116. See supra Part lI.B.
117. See supra note 47. For example, other provisions of MCARE establish a Patient
Safety Authority and Patient Safety Committees that review, report on, and make
recommendations regarding patient safety at medical facilities. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §
1303.301-.314 (West 2002). Further, the statute provides for civil penalties and license
revocations in certain circumstances. Id. § 1303.901-.910.
118. With the exception of emergencies, as is recognized by the MCARE informed
consent statute as well as under common law. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.504 (West
2002) (requiring a physician obtain the patient's informed consent in certain
circumstances unless it is an emergency situation); In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 910 (Pa.
1996) (absent an emergency, physician required to obtain informed consent in common
law). Requiring informed consent for all medical procedures would not be overly
burdensome as the information required to be relayed is limited in scope. See supra note
50.
119. Thus assumes there is merit to the argument that malpractice claims are largely
responsible for physicians' spiraling insurance premiums. Further, there are other means
to reduce physician malpractice insurance costs. Sam Marshall, the President of the
Insurance Federation of Pennsylvania, pushes for the creation of "[a] statewide
malpractice court" to reform a system that is "too expensive and too unpredictable."
Medical Malpractice, SUNDAY PATRIOT NEWs, Dec. 8, 2002, at Fl. David L. Lutz,
President of the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association, urges state provided
malpractice insurance, the creation of "risk retention groups" (wherein doctors pool risk
and pay premiums relative to their experience and any claims they may have had to pay),
and the oversight of insurance company investments or reliance on investments when
deciding premium rates. Id. Doctor J. Bret Delone of the Kunkel Surgical Group urges
for capping damages and lawyer fees. Id. Others suggest requiring expert certification as
to the validity of claims. David Weiss, Widow's Reward Is Answers in Death, WILKES-
BARRE TIMES LEADER, Jan. 14, 2003, available at 2003 WL 2575650. Whatever the
solution, each of the above suggests that there exist less burdensome means than
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Assuming informed consent is deemed a Fourteenth Amendment
right, even if the statute were repealed or struck down,1 20 it is
questionable whether utilizing the doctrine's common law scope of
surgical or operative procedures would always be constitutional.
121
Pennsylvania owned hospitals are considered state actors, and thus
informed consent policies should be required for non-surgical procedures
performed therein.122 Non-surgical procedures paid for with government
funds could also arguably bring physicians treating patients using
Medicare, Medicaid, or other government assistance programs back
within the realm of the Fourteenth Amendment. What arises is a system
wherein patients utilizing government hospitals and physicians are
afforded the protections of the constitution, whereas private hospitals and
patients paying for services via private insurance or their own funds are
not. 123
trampling on the rights of patients.
120. Thus withdrawing the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.
12 1. In addition, an analysis may lead one to conclude it is unconstitutional under the
Pennsylvania Constitution as well.
122. Multiple physicians may be deemed liable when none have obtained a patients
informed consent, and thus it follows that hospitals should be required to at least
promulgate and enforce informed consent policies for physicians utilizing a hospital's
facilities. Grabowski v. Quigley, 684 A.2d 610 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (remanding for
determination as to vicarious liability of other physicians that also attended to patient).
But see Valles v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 805 A.2d 1232, 1239 (Pa. 2002) (holding
hospital cannot be liable for physician failure to obtain informed consent). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Valles appears a departure from stare decisis
in an attempt to further appease insurance concerns. See, e.g., Tonsic v. Wagner, 329
A.2d 497, 500-01 (Pa. 1974) (hospital as "captain of the ship" may be held vicariously
liable for negligence of physicians). The court in Valles asserted that "a battery which
results from a lack of informed consent is not the type of action that occurs within the
scope of employment." Valles, 805 A.2d at 1239. Bolstering this assertion, the court
noted the "unique nature" of the doctrine distinguishes it from hospitals held vicariously
liable for negligence, as does the difficulty a hospital would have in controlling physician
informed consent actions in the intimate physician-patient relationship. Id. Perhaps the
court will next allow law firms immunity from malpractice suits when they have not
instituted procedures to ensure accurate billing methods or conflict of interest checks in
the similarly intimate attorney-client relationship.
123. Even if the Fourteenth Amendment requirement for informed consent were not
determined uniformly applicable to state and privately funded hospitals and procedures
via equal protection clauses, the end result may still prove beneficial to both. Whether
deserved or not, a state hospital may not have as good a reputation as a private hospital
(such a perception might be attributable to the idea that physicians working in state
hospitals are typically paid less than those in private practice, and thus considered by
some as inferior physicians, or hospitals with inferior treatment, relative to private
physicians and private hospitals). Affording extra protection to patients who use state
hospitals and physicians may do much to increase the reputations and standards of care at
all hospitals. Patients that can afford to be treated at private hospitals may seek the added
Fourteenth Amendment protection at state hospitals, forcing competition. Further, as
physicians are not always aware of whether government funds are being used to pay for a
patient's care, physicians in private practice may choose to err on the side of caution and
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D. Possible Solutions
There are several means to resolve the deficiencies in MCARE's
informed consent statute. 124 First, instead of correcting common law
wrongs, the General Assembly could do that which the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has been unwilling, and now is likely unable, to do--
bring the doctrine of informed consent into the twenty-first century by
redefining it in a much broader manner. Redefining informed consent to
encompass all potentially harmful medical procedures would clear the
slate of restrictions and allow for the creation of a continuously
developing body of law that would be adaptable to the ever-evolving
nature of science and medicine. Admittedly, such a broadening of
informed consent would result in a system mirroring common law
approaches, but it would serve to break the outdated "surgery" shackles
and continuously supplement MCARE's deficient list of procedures.
Second, the judiciary could avoid case-specific injustices, as well as
potential constitutional problems, by reading the enumerated procedures
in MCARE's informed consent statute as illustrative rather than
exhaustive. This would allow the courts to create a parallel test to apply,
or a list of procedures to turn to, in conjunction with a statutory informed
consent analysis.
Finally, the judiciary could interpret the statute to require a lesser,
stream-lined version of informed consent for procedures not enumerated
in the statute. There might, of course, be problems inherent in both
attempting to and succeeding in reducing the now well-established
standard, but it could serve as a useful bridge over the chasm between
MCARE informed consent and patient rights.
V. Conclusion
The codification of informed consent under Pennsylvania's Medical
Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act is not only out-dated and
ill-serving, but also potentially unconstitutional. With few exceptions,
MCARE informed consent is limited to common law notions of
"surgical" procedures, and thus does not adequately protect patient
welfare in the face of advancing medical technology. Further, in their
respective "right to die" cases, the United States and Pennsylvania
Supreme Courts recognized a patient's right to refuse unwanted
treatment, built upon notions of bodily integrity and informed consent.
seek informed consent from all patients.
124. An alternative not discussed here would be to shift to a negligence, rather than a
battery, approach to informed consent. See Warren, supra note 36, at 917; Durst, supra
note 36, at 197.
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As such, informed consent may have become a de facto right for all
medical treatment, and thus Pennsylvania's statutory informed consent
could be granting physicians an illegitimate privilege directly at odds
with the courts' decisions.
Given the statute's potential for injustice and its possible
unconstitutionality, the judiciary should liberally construe it to
encompass procedures not enumerated, until such time as the General
Assembly can revisit and more broadly define informed consent.

